Andrew LeMieux

How Do I Access the Lands Under a Federal Oil and Gas Lease?

At the end of Disney/Pixar’s “Finding Nemo,” a group of fish escape from their tank by jumping into plastic bags that are filled with water and then securely tied at the top. After hopping out of a window, they cross a busy street and land safely in the waters of Sydney Harbour. Still in a plastic bag and bobbing up and down on the water, one of the fish asks an important question: “Now what?” The whole point of escaping was to obtain freedom from captivity. Similarly, the whole point of obtaining a federal oil and gas lease is to produce the natural resources on which our nation relies. To do so, however, requires obtaining the necessary surface use authorizations, which can be complicated.

Lease Rights

The current form of federal oil and gas lease[1] grants to the lessee “the exclusive right to drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of all the oil and gas (except helium) [in the leased lands] together with the right to build and maintain necessary improvements . . . .”[2] Those rights, however, are “subject to applicable laws, the terms, conditions, and attached stipulations of [the] lease, the Secretary of the Interior’s regulations and formal orders in effect as of lease issuance, and to regulations and formal orders [promulgated after lease issuance] when not inconsistent with lease rights granted or specific provisions of [the] lease.”[3] That’s where things get complicated.

As mentioned, federal oil and gas leases are subject to “applicable laws.” Generally, this means federal laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[4] and Endangered Species Act,[5] which can significantly impact a lessee’s ability to access federal oil and gas. There are several other laws that may apply to the extraction of federal oil and gas, including state laws and local ordinances, and operators should consult with competent legal counsel when evaluating their compliance with all applicable laws.

Compliance must also be made with the terms and conditions of the lease. The current form of lease and current regulations, for example, require a bond for lease operations. This requirement can be satisfied by obtaining a lease bond (at least $10,000), a statewide bond (at least $25,000), or a nationwide bond (at least $150,000). An operator may apply for partial release of a lease bond as reclamation operations are completed. Partial release is not available for statewide or nationwide bonds.

Another example of lease terms and conditions is the “conduct of operations” section of the current lease form. This section requires the lessee to “conduct operations in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or users.” These requirements can express themselves in many ways. The BLM (and FS) have published generally applicable standards and guidelines for operators engaged in the production of federal oil and gas, commonly known as “The Gold Book,” which provides an indication of how the BLM may require operations to be conducted.[6]

As noted, a federal oil and gas lease is also subject to any attached stipulations. The specific stipulations will depend on the characteristics of the leased lands. By way of example, those stipulations may include, but are certainly not limited to, restrictions on operations due to (1) threatened, endangered, and special status species; (2) animal breeding or nesting sites; (3) protection of cultural resources; (4) congressionally designated historic trails; and (5) avoidance of conflicts due to multiple mineral development. The restrictions may sometimes be seasonal or only applicable during a certain time of day. It is important to carefully review all of the stipulations attached to your lease to ensure that your proposed operations can comply with them.

The Secretary of the Interior has also published regulations, formal orders, and “Notices to Lessees” that govern access to federal oil and gas. Many of the relevant regulations can be found in 43 CFR Part 3160, et seq. There are currently seven “Onshore Oil and Gas Orders” that govern federal oil and gas operations, including Onshore Order No. 1 (approval of operations); Onshore Order No. 2 (drilling); and Onshore Order No. 3 (site security). There are currently two National Notices to Lessees (NTLs) promulgated by the BLM, which govern the reporting of undesirable events and royalty or compensation for oil and gas lost, as well as one Utah-specific NTL regarding the standards for use of electronic flow computers in gas measurement.[7]

The surface access rights granted under a federal oil and gas lease only apply to operations on the leased lands or lands that are unitized therewith and are authorized as part of an Application for Permit to Drill (APD), as discussed below. For operations outside of the leased lands or unit, a right-of-way, permit, or other authorization will need to be obtained from the federal government, the state government, or private surface owner(s), as applicable.

Permitting and Approval of Lease Operations

The earlier you can start the process of gaining access to federal oil and gas, the better. Early coordination with the BLM during the planning stages can help bring to light site-specific issues and local requirements, which generally leads to a more efficient permit approval process. In addition to a BLM-approved APD, an operator will need to obtain any approvals required by other federal, Tribal, state, or local authorities, which can also take some time.

There are additional considerations that apply in split-estate situations (non-federal surface over federal oil and gas). When split-estate is involved, an operator must make a good faith effort to notify the surface owner before entering the land to conduct surveys or stake a well location. An operator is also required to make a good-faith effort to negotiate a surface use agreement (SUA) with the surface owner. If negotiations are not successful, then a separate bond will be required as part of APD approval. The bond must be at least $1,000 and is designed to compensate the surface owner for reasonable and foreseeable loss of crops and damage to improvements. If the surface owner objects to the amount of the bond, then the BLM will review and either confirm the previously established bond amount or set a new amount.

Geophysical operations involving federal oil and gas are considered lease operations that may be performed on a federal lease after filing a Sundry Notice[8] or Notice of Intent and Authorization to Conduct Oil and Gas Geophysical Exploration Operations (Notice of Intent)[9] with the BLM. The party filing the Notice of Intent will need to be bonded. The BLM may require cultural resource or threatened/endangered species surveys for geophysical operations that will involve surface disturbance. BLM approval is not necessary for geophysical operations involving federal oil and gas under fee or state surface. In that case, an operator must work with the fee surface owner or relevant state agency to obtain access to the lands.

Surveying and staking can take place before approval of an APD, but APD approval is required before drilling and any related surface-disturbing operations. To apply for a permit to drill, an operator has two options: (1) file a Notice of Staking (NOS), followed by an APD; or (2) file an APD only. An NOS is a formal request for an onsite inspection[10] prior to filing an APD and it initiates the 30-day posting period that the BLM is required to follow before approving an APD. Filing an NOS can be particularly useful if the operator anticipates concerns that will eventually need to be addressed in an APD. The BLM has published a sample form of NOS,[11] but no specific form is required.

A completed APD package includes (1) APD Form 3160-3;[12] (2) a well plat certified by a registered surveyor; (3) a Drilling Plan; (4) a Surface Use Plan of Operations (including a reclamation plan);[13] (5) evidence of bond coverage; (6) operator certification in accordance with the requirements of Onshore Order No. 1; and (7) any other information required by order, notice, or regulation. An operator may file a Master Development Plan for multiple wells within a single Drilling Plan and Surface Use Plan of Operations, but an APD and survey plat still have to be submitted for each individual well. Changes to plans reflected in an APD must be submitted for BLM approval by filing a Sundry Notice. After the well is completed, a Well Completion Report[14] must be filed. As of March 13, 2017, all of these filings must be done through the BLM’s electronic filing system.

The BLM is charged with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with NEPA. When evaluating an APD, the BLM will conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA), if one has not already been done, and issue a decision in that regard. Issues raised by an EA may prompt a more-comprehensive Environmental Impact Study, delay approval of an APD, or result in stipulations or conditions of approval in addition to those that are attached to the lease.

Before approving an APD, the BLM will also conduct an onsite inspection (whether initiated as part of an NOS or APD) to identify site-specific issues and requirements. The BLM will notify the operator if any cultural resource studies or threatened or endangered species studies will be required. The operator, any parties associated with the planning of a drilling project (such as the operator’s dirtwork contractor or drilling contractor), and the fee surface owner, if any, will be invited to attend the onsite inspection.

If an operator desires to request a variance from the requirements of an onshore order, or an exception, waiver, or modification of a stipulation attached to a lease, then a request may be filed with the BLM, explaining the basis for the variance and how the intent of the onshore order will be satisfied, or the reason(s) why the stipulation is no longer justified.


[1] For purposes of this article, “federal” refers to federal government lands administered exclusively by the Bureau of Land Management (the “BLM”), as opposed to the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service (the “FS”), other surface management agencies, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (the “BIA”). While the BLM works with the BIA, FS, and other surface management agencies in administering the lands within their stewardship, the nuances relating to the lands of those other agencies are not addressed in this article.
[2] Form 3100-11, Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, available at https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Services_National-Operations-Center_Eforms_Fluid-and-Solid-Minerals_3100-011.pdf.
[3] Id.
[4] See 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.
[5] See 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq.
[6] See, e.g., Surface Operating Standards and Guidelines for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development, United States Department of the Interior and United States Department of Agriculture, 2007, p. 41 (regarding painting of facilities), available at https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/oil-and-gas/operations-and-production/the-gold-book (The Gold Book).
[7] Links to the regulations, onshore orders, and NTLs are available at blm.gov.
[8] Form 3160-5, available at https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Services_National-Operations-Center_Eforms_Fluid-and-Solid-Minerals_3160-005.pdf.
[9] Form 3150-4, available at https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Services_National-Operations-Center_Eforms_Fluid-and-Solid-Minerals_3150-004.pdf.
[10] The BLM has 10 days to schedule an onsite inspection after receiving an NOS or APD, but there is no deadline for when the inspection itself must to take place.
[11] See The Gold Book, p. 61.
[12] Available at https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/uploads/Services_National-Operations-Center_Eforms_Fluid-and-Solid-Minerals_3160-003.pdf.
[13] In a split-estate situation, an operator must make a good-faith effort to provide the surface owner with copies of (1) the Surface Use Plan of Operations; (2) the approved APD with its conditions of approval; and (3) any proposals involving new surface disturbance.
[14] Form 3160-4, available at https://www.blm.gov/sites/blm.gov/files/3160-004.pdf.

Utah Supreme Court Invalidates Tax Title as to Severed Minerals on Due Process Grounds

Can Utah’s four-year statute of limitations for challenging a tax sale prevent a property owner who never received notice of the sale from contesting it?  In prior years, the answer may have been “yes.”  In Jordan v. Jensen, 2017 UT 1, 2017 WL 104642, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the answer is an unequivocal “no.”

In Jordan, the owners of the surface and mineral estates conveyed the surface and reserved the minerals in a deed recorded in early 1995, prior to levy and assessment of the property taxes by Uintah County.  The new surface owner failed to fully pay the property taxes levied by the County for 1995, and as a result, the County sold the property at a tax sale in 2000, without notifying the mineral interest owners.  Id. ¶¶ 4-6.  Years later, an oil and gas company seeking to develop the mineral estate obtained a title opinion that indicated that there was a question whether the severed minerals passed at the tax sale because the tax deed did not contain any language reserving the mineral interest.  The mineral interest owners unsuccessfully tried to obtain a quitclaim deed from the surface owners and eventually sued to quiet title to the minerals.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

The surface owners argued, among other things, that the County’s general property tax assessment included the nonproducing mineral estate and that the failure to give notice to the mineral owners did not void the tax deed as to the mineral interest because Utah has a four-year statute of limitations that bars challenges to a tax deed.  See id. ¶¶ 13-14.  (Under Utah law, the authority to tax minerals has been delegated exclusively to the Utah State Tax Commission.  The surface owners argued that his delegation was limited to producing minerals and that the counties had the authority to tax the nonproducing minerals).  The district court rejected the surface owners’ arguments and entered summary judgment in favor of the mineral owners.  The surface owners appealed.  Id. ¶ 11.

In its decision in Jordan, the Utah Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether a county has the authority to assess the nonproducing mineral interest, instead limiting its holding to the due process issue.  Id. ¶ 12.

Specifically, the court analyzed whether the four-year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206 prevented a challenge to the tax title even though the mineral owners never received notice of the County’s tax sale as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Jordan, 2017 UT 1, ¶ 16.  In Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a tax sale based on the predecessor to section 206.  The court in Hansen stated that “a failure to provide notice or a due process violation does not prevent section 206 from applying to ‘validate tax titles.’”  Jordan, 2017 UT 1, ¶ 22 (quoting Hansen, 283 P.2d at 885).

In overturning Hansen, the Jordan court noted that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases have taken a different approach, finding that a statute of limitations “will not apply when it is triggered by constitutionally defective state action.”  Id. ¶ 23 (citing Schroeder v. City of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988)).  Applying these cases, the Jordan court held that section 206 requires state action—the conducting of a tax sale—before it takes effect, and that section 206 will not prevent a party from challenging a tax sale if constitutionally adequate notice is not provided to that party.  Id. ¶ 34.  The court also noted that constructive notice by recording a tax title is insufficient where the mineral owners’ names and addresses are “reasonably ascertainable and known to the county,” as was the case here.  Id. ¶ 38; see id. ¶ 37.  Rather, notice to such owners must be mailed to their last known address of record or otherwise given in a manner that ensures its delivery.  Id. ¶ 37.

The court concluded that because the mineral owners did not receive constitutionally adequate notice, the County did not have jurisdiction over the mineral interest, thus voiding the tax title to the extent it purported to convey the mineral interest.  Id. ¶ 42.  In doing so, the court overruled Hansen “[t]o the extent [it] states that section 206 can apply where a state or county fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice to an interested party of a tax sale….”  Id. ¶ 40.

(Re-printed from Andrew J. LeMieux, Utah Oil & Gas, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, Volume XXXIV, Number 1, 2017)

Utah Oil & Gas Update

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIES THE OPEN MINES DOCTRINE, REJECTS PETITION TO CONSTRUE WILL IN FAVOR OF LIFE TENANTS

In re Estate of Womack, 2016 UT App 83, 2016 WL 1729528, involved a decedent whose formally probated Will devised a 160-acre parcel to his three children, in equal shares. See id. ¶ 2. In his Will, the decedent specified that “the oil, gas and mineral rights under the said property . . . are devised to each of my children, share and share alike, for life,” remainder to the decedent’s grandchildren. Id. In 1990, the district court entered an estate closing order that named the decedent’s three children as the owners of the 160-acre parcel outright. Id. ¶ 3. In 1992, the district court amended the estate closing order “to conform to the Will” and provide for the grandchildren’s remainder in the minerals, which had been incorrectly omitted in the prior order. Id. ¶ 4. In 2008, an oil and gas company leased the minerals underlying the 160-acre parcel, but a question arose as to who was entitled to the proceeds of production. Id. ¶ 5.

In an effort to clarify who was entitled to the proceeds of production, one of the life tenants petitioned the district court to reopen the decedent’s estate and construe the Will in favor of the life tenants. According to the life tenant, the prior order’s lack of specificity resulted in an ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the life tenants, based on an affidavit from the drafting attorney regarding the decedent’s intent. Id. ¶¶ 5 and 6. Two of the remaindermen challenged the petition, asserting that the requested relief would require the court to re-construe a provision of the Will that had already been construed, and that the court would be required to vacate or modify its prior order. This, the remaindermen contended, was barred by a six-month statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412). The district court agreed with the remaindermen and denied the life tenant’s petition to construe the Will.

The life tenant appealed, claiming that the district court had misinterpreted the nature of the petition, and that the petition only sought clarification of the prior estate closing order, which was not subject to the six-month limitations period. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court cited the open mines doctrine and concluded that the remaindermen were entitled to the proceeds of production because the Will did not specify otherwise. The Court found that the prior estate closing order had already construed the Will as creating life estates in mineral rights, and “[l]ife estates in mineral rights, by default, do not encompass a right to any proceeds from new mineral extraction.” Id. ¶ 17 (citing Hynson v. Jeffries, 697 So.2d 792, 797 (Miss. Ct. App. 1997). In the Court’s view, the Will was not ambiguous, and clarification was not necessary. Id. The Court found that the prior estate closing order “implicitly granted extraction proceeds to the [remaindermen] (albeit by default).” Id. ¶ 19. Because the petition sought to prove the decedent’s intent for the life tenants to receive income from the minerals, “rather than letting such proceeds default to the holders of the remainder” under common law, the Court found that the six-month time limit for vacations and modifications of prior orders applied, and the petition was time-barred. Id.

UTAH LEGISLATURE CONFIRMS THAT FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL INTERESTS MUST BE EXCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING SEVERANCE TAX ON OIL AND GAS

In the May 2015 edition of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, we reported on the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 25, 345 P.3d 648 (Utah 2015). In Anadarko, the Court held that an oil and gas operator may exclude federal, state, and tribal interests when calculating its severance tax rate.

The Utah legislature recently codified the rule established by Anadarko. See S.B. 17, ch. 324, 2016 Utah Laws (amending Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-102 and 59-5-103.1). S.B. 17 confirms that the severance tax on oil and gas does not apply to federal, state, or tribal interests in oil and gas. As such, for purposes of determining the amount of severance tax, these exempt interests should be excluded when calculating the value of oil and gas and the tax rate. S.B. 17 applies to a taxable year beginning on or after January 1, 2015, as well as to severance taxes “for any taxable year, including a taxable year beginning before January 1, 2015, that is the subject of an appeal that was filed or pending on or after January 1, 2016.” Id.

(Re-printed from Andrew J. LeMieux, Utah Oil & Gas, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, May 2016)

Deducting Post-Production Costs From Fee Royalty

The phone rings. It’s your owner relations department. They just received a call from a lessor who has been taking a closer look at the information provided along with the lessor’s oil and gas royalty checks. The lessor wants to know why you are deducting post-production costs, such as transportation or compression of gas, when calculating the lessor’s royalty.

The deductibility of post-production costs can have significant implications for an oil and gas lessee. Several commentators have addressed this issue in-depth over the years.1 This article is intended to provide an introduction to the deductibility of post-production costs under fee oil and gas leases.2

Production Costs vs. Post-Production Costs

Normally, the lessee under an oil and gas lease, not the lessor, is responsible for paying the expenses of exploration and production.3 These generally include the costs associated with geophysical surveying, drilling, testing, completing, and reworking a well, as well as secondary recovery.4

Post-production costs that may, or may not, be deductible when calculating the royalty generally include gross production and severance taxes, transportation costs, and the costs of dehydrating, compressing, or otherwise processing gas (such as the extraction of liquids from gas or casinghead gas).5

Lease Provisions

When determining whether post-production costs are deductible from the royalty, the lease should be carefully examined. Sometimes the lease terms will specify whether post-production costs are deductible. For example, as part of the royalty clause, a lease may provide:

Lessee shall have the right to deduct from Lessor’s royalty on any gas produced hereunder the royalty share of the cost, if any, of compression for delivery, transportation and/or delivery thereof.6

But what if the lease does not include a provision such as the one above? Or what if the lease provides for the payment of royalty based on market value or net proceeds “at the well”7 but does not spell out the types of post-production costs that are deductible before the royalty is calculated? Is that enough?

“At the Well”

The following is an example of a gas royalty provision with “at the well” language:

Royalties to be paid by Lessee are: . . . (b) on gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substance, produced from said land and sold or used, the market value at the well of one-eighth (1/8) of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the well the royalty shall be one-eighth (1/8) of the amount realized from such sales[.]8

Bice v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C.9 provides an example of the majority view on deducting post-production costs when the royalty clause contains “at the well” language.10 In Bice, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined whether processing costs for sour gas were properly deducted when calculating the royalty under oil and gas leases that contained “market value at the well” language. The Court noted that the majority of oil and gas producing states have adopted the “at the well” rule and “interpret the term ‘market value at the well’ to mean royalty is calculated based on the value of the gas at the wellhead.”11 The Court also noted that in states that have adopted the “at the well” rule,12 a lessee has the option of calculating the market value at the well through the “comparable sales method” or the “work-back” (a/k/a “net-back”) method.13 The comparable sales method involves “‘averaging the prices that the lessee and other producers are receiving, at the same time and in the same field, for oil or gas of comparable quality, quantity, and availability.’”14 Under the work-back method, the “market value at the well” is determined by deducting reasonable post-production costs (incurred after the product is extracted from the ground) from the sales price received at a downstream point of sale.15

The Court found that the gas at issue had “no discernible market value at the well before it is processed . . . .”16 The Court reasoned that “[s]ince the contracted for royalty is based on the market value of the gas at the well and the gas has no market value at the well, the only way to determine the market value of the gas at the well is to work back from where a market value exists . . . .”17 Adopting the “at the well” rule, the Court held that the operator properly deducted post-production costs for processing prior to calculating the royalty.18

A similar result was reached in Emery Resource Holdings, LLC v. Coastal Plains Energy, Inc.19 In Emery, the federal district court in Utah was asked to interpret oil and gas leases that contained “at the well” royalty clauses20 and determine whether post-production gathering and processing costs were deductible.21 The Court noted that “[t]he majority of courts . . . have found ‘at the well’ royalty clauses to mean that natural gas is valued for royalty purposes at its wellhead location and condition.”22 Predicting what a Utah court would do when faced with this situation,23 the Court inEmery held that the “at the well” language in the leases was clear and that the parties intended for the royalty to be calculated according to the market value at the well.24 Thus, the Court allowed the operator to deduct post-production costs incurred from the wellhead separators to the pipeline in determining the market value at the well prior to calculating the royalty.25

In some states, however, including the words “at the well” in the royalty provision may not be enough. For example, inRogers v. Westerman Farm Co.26 the Colorado Supreme Court determined whether post-production costs were properly deducted under leases that provided for royalty “at the well” or “at the mouth of the well.” The Court held that the leases were “silent” as to the allocation of post-production costs, even with “at the well” language.27 The Court held that “[a]bsent express lease provisions addressing allocation of costs, the lessee’s duty to market requires that the lessee bear the expenses incurred in obtaining a marketable product. Thus, the expense of getting the product to a marketable condition and location are borne by the lessee.”28 After the product is “marketable,” any further costs incurred in improving the product or transporting it may be shared by the lessor and lessee.29 The point at which the gas is “marketable” is a question of fact for the judge or jury to decide.30 Thus, in Colorado,31 lease language that defines the royalty as being payable “at the well” or “at the mouth of the well” is not enough to allocate post-production costs.32

Conclusion

Now is the time for lessees under fee oil and gas leases to carefully examine their records, on a lease-by-lease basis, and determine whether they are properly deducting post-production costs prior to calculating the royalty. The deductibility of post-production costs depends on the lease terms and the laws of the state where the leased lands are located. Lessees should not, and in some states cannot, rely on “at the well” language to provide for the deduction of post-production costs. As needed, lessees should modify their lease forms to specifically provide for the deduction of post-production costs and identify all of the post-production costs that are deductible.


How to increase attention to detail in title examination.


1See Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 645, Footnote 1 (2014) for citations to such articles.
2This article is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the law on the deductibility of post-production costs or the law of any particular jurisdiction. The reader should consult with competent legal counsel regarding the law that applies to any particular situation and jurisdiction.
3Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 645.1 (2014).
4Id.
5Id. § 645.2.
6Id. § 643 (quoting a Mid-Continent lease form).
7The term “at the well” is often included in the royalty clause of an oil and gas lease in defining the point of valuation of the oil and gas. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 63 (2009).
8Brown, The Law of Oil and Gas Leases, 2nd Edition § 6.13 (2014) (emphasis added).
9768 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 2009).
10Id. at 499.
11Id. at 500-501 (citing Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine: Just What is the Product?, 37 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 51 (2005); Edward B. Poitevent, II, Post-Production Deductions from Royalty, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 709, 716 (2003); and Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs When Calculating Royalty: What Does The Lease Provide?, 8 Appalachian J.L. 1, 7 (2008)).
12The Court noted that Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, California, Kentucky, Montana, and New Mexico follow the “at the well” rule. Bice, at 501 (citing Babin v. First Energy Corp., 96 1232, p. 2 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97); 693 So.2d 813, 815;Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. 1996); Piney Woods Country Life Sch. v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984) (interpreting Mississippi law); Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v. BP America Prod. Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 2005); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, 214 Cal. App. 3d 533, 262 Cal.Rptr. 683, 688 (1989);Montana Power Co. v. Kravik, 179 Mont. 87, 586 P.2d 298, 303 (1978); Reed v. Hackworth, 287 S.W.2d 912, 913 (Ky. 1956)).
13Bice, at 501.
14Id. (quoting Keeling & Gillespie, supra, at 31-32).
15Id. (quoting Keeling & Gillespie, supra, at 32).
16Id. at 502.
17Id. The Court noted that the comparable sales method was unavailable to calculate the royalty in this case because “no comparable sales exist since the gas is not saleable at the wellhead.” Id.
18Id. For an in-depth analysis of the Court’s decision in Bice, see David E. Pierce, Royalty Jurisprudence: A Tale of Two States, 49 Washburn L.J. 347, 370-374 (2009).
19915 F.Supp.2d 1231 (D. Utah 2012).
20Most of the leases included the words “at the well” in the royalty clause. Id. at 1237. Two of the leases provided for royalty on “the proceeds from the sale of the gas, as such, for gas from wells where gas only is found . . . .” Id. at 1238. The Court examined the language surrounding this clause and concluded that “the parties intended all products produced from the wells to be valued at the prevailing market rate at the wellhead” rather than “some location downstream and away from the leased premises.” Id. at 1238-39.
21Id. at 1235.
22Id. at 1240 (citations omitted).
23Noting that the Utah Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the deductibility of post-production costs in oil and gas operations, the Court in Emery looked to the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Rimledge Uranium and Mining Corp. v. Federal Resources Corp., 374 P.2d 20 (1962). Emery, at 1241. In Rimledge, the Utah Supreme Court found that where a deed of uranium mining claims provided for a royalty of 15% “of all gross proceeds from the sale of ore,” the parties intended for the royalty to be based on the sale proceeds of raw ore, or the fair market value of raw ore in the vicinity, rather than the value of concentrated ore after processing in the mill. Emery, at 1242.
24Id.
25Id.
2629 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).
27Id. at 902.
28Id.
29Id.
30Rogers, at 906.
31Other states that have rejected the “at the well” rule include Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas and West Virginia. Bice, supra, at 501 (citing Keeling & Gillespie, supra, at 51; Wheeler, supra, at 10).
32For an in-depth analysis of the Court’s decision in Rogerssee Pierce, supra, at 358-364; see also Martin & Kramer,supra, at § 645.

The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Primer for Landmen

Your attorney has finally sent you a title opinion advising you that some of your leases may be dead. Management decides to drill anyway. It’s a gusher and the lessors sue. Can you prevent the title opinion from being given to the lessors’ attorneys? What if you previously gave a copy of the opinion to an independent contractor landman to work on curative for you? What if you gave it to other working interest owners in the drillsite? The attorney-client privilege may protect confidential information from disclosure in a lawsuit, but the privilege does not apply in all instances.1

The attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications between attorneys and their clients, or their respective representatives, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. If the privilege applies, it can protect such communications from mandatory disclosure in a lawsuit or other legal proceeding. The privilege may apply to oral or written communications. There is no “blanket” privilege for title opinions or any other type of attorney-client communication. Rather, whether the privilege applies to a communication is determined on a case-by-case basis.

The confidentiality of the communication is key. A confidential communication is one that the client reasonably expects will be kept confidential and that is not disclosed, or intended to be disclosed, to persons other than the attorney and client or their respective representatives. If a client discloses, or consents to the disclosure of, the communication to a third party, then the privilege may be lost. So, is the privilege lost when an operator gives a copy of a title opinion received from an attorney to participating working interest owners? There does not appear to be any case law addressing this situation, but it is possible that the operator’s disclosure of the title opinion to those third parties might be viewed as a waiver of the privilege, and the title opinion might be admitted as evidence in a lawsuit or other legal proceeding against the operator, such as in a lawsuit alleging a title defect that invalidates the operator’s oil and gas lease(s) and that was discussed in the title opinion.

Generally, if disclosure to a third party serves the interests of the client, or if the third party’s presence is necessary to accomplish the purposes of consulting the attorney, then disclosure to the third party might not waive the privilege. For example, if an operator’s independent contractor, such as an independent landman who is working for the operator, learns of or participates in a confidential communication between an attorney and the operator, the privileged status of the communication might not be in jeopardy if the independent contractor is the “functional equivalent” of an employee of the operator.

What happens when only part of a privileged communication (for example, a single comment and requirement of a title opinion) is disclosed to a third party? Is the privilege lost for the entire communication? Some courts view disclosure of a single communication as waiving the privilege for all communications regarding the “same subject matter.” In theory, a court could view the entire title opinion as one communication about a single subject matter—title to the subject lands—and require disclosure of the entire opinion. Other courts, however, take a more narrow approach and attempt to distinguish between what is privileged and what is not, finding that the privilege is lost only as to those portions of a communication that were disclosed to third parties. In short, if the privilege is lost for one comment and requirement, the privilege may still be intact as to a comment and requirement regarding a completely different subject matter, depending on the facts of the case and the court’s approach to the scope of the waiver.2

Not all types of communications are privileged. To be privileged, the communication must relate to legal advice. For example, if an attorney-client communication relates to business advice, as opposed to advice regarding an operator’s legal rights and obligations, then the privilege may not apply. In instances where the communication contains both legal and non-legal advice, then to the extent the non-legal advice can be separated from the legal advice, the privilege may not apply. Further, if an attorney has been hired to merely draft a document, such as a deed, as opposed to providing advice regarding a document’s legal effect, then the privilege may not apply and the attorney may be required to testify in a legal proceeding as to communications regarding the drafting of the document.

In sum, if you disclose a confidential communication or legal advice that is covered by the attorney-client privilege to a third party, then you may be required to disclose it again, but this time in a lawsuit or other legal proceeding. If you must share the confidential communication or legal advice to a third party, then you should only disclose those portions of the communication that absolutely must be disclosed in an effort to preserve the privilege for as much of the communication as possible.

1This article discusses certain aspects of the attorney-client privilege in general terms and is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the law of attorney-client privilege or the law of any particular jurisdiction. The reader should consult with competent legal counsel regarding the law that applies to any particular situation and jurisdiction.
2There are relatively few court cases that deal directly with title opinions and the attorney-client privilege. However, the Supreme Court of Colorado recently discussed the privilege in the context of title opinions and noted that if the parties cannot agree as to what title opinions, or portions of title opinions, are privileged, then the court can be requested to review the title opinions to determine what is privileged and what is not. See DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, 303 P.3d 1187, 1200 (Colo. 2013). Therefore, it appears that at least one court has recognized the possibility of having portions of a title opinion covered by the privilege, even if other portions are not